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THE MORAL EXCLUSIVITY OF THE NEW CIVIL SOCIETY 
DOROTHY E. ROBERTS* 
INTRODUCTION 
When I was a little girl, I learned a folk tale about the fate of 
naughty children on Christmas morning. They receive gifts wrapped 
nicely in beautiful paper and tied with pretty ribbons, nestled under 
the family 's evergreen tree. But when they open up the lovely 
package, the children discover to their horror that it is filled with 
coals. I experienced the same sensation of initial enticement, 
followed by dismay, in reading recent appeals to revive civil society. 1 
They come in an attractive package bearing principles of equal 
citizenship and solidarity that opens to a largely exclusionary and 
regressive agenda. Many of the revivalists' basic axioms for civic 
renewal are commendable. Their call to sustain our "commitment to 
freedom and justice for all,"2 their concern for the local institutions 
that foster citizenship, and their insistence on a public moral 
philosophy to animate civic engagement are important elements of a 
more democratic and egalitarian society.3 But the translation of these 
admirable principles into a concrete program centered on traditional 
morality and modes of association takes an unfortunate turn. 
* Pro fessor, Northwestern University School of Law; Faculty Fellow, Institute for Policy 
Research. 
1. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY D EMOCRACY 
NEEDS MORAL TRUTHS (1998); NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, A NATION OF 
SPECTATORS: How CIVIC DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN Do 
ABOUT IT (1998) . I will call the contempo rary group of scholars whose views are incorporated 
in these reports "civil society revivalists." 
2. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, a t 3. 
3. I have advocated each of these precepts in my own writing. See, e.g., Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Wh o Have Babies: Women of Color, Eq uality, and the Right of 
Privacy, 104 H ARV. L. REV. 1419, 1471-82 (1991) (developing an interpretation of constitutional 
equal protection and privacy that would enhance freedom and justice); Dorothy E. R oberts, 
Sources of Commitmem to Social Justice, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 175, 195-203 (1998) 
(advoca ting a moral commitment to social justice as the source of public support for more 
ega litarian policies) ; D orothy E. Roberts, W elfare and the Problem of Black Citizens/z ip , 105 
YALE L.J. 1563, 1595-1602 (1996) (book review) (proposing an approach that incorporates both 
Black community development and self-determination and national welfare po licies to 
strengthen Black citizenship). 
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Beneath the appeals to equality and justice lies a conception of civil 
society more concerned with rescuing a disappearing way of life than 
with ending persistent economic and social disparities.4 
What results is a moral vision marred by exclusivity.5 I mean this 
in two senses: civil society revivalists promote a narrow meaning of 
morality that excludes social justice from its heart; their plan for 
reform consequently privileges those who benefit most from societal 
inequality and penalizes those who are most injured by it. Most 
notably excluded is a serious recognition of past and present racism 
and its fatal impact on any effort to forge a common civic purpose 
among Americans.6 
This essay begins by locating the source of the revivalists' moral 
exclusivity in their flawed account of the relationship between social 
inequality and moral decline. First, the revivalists attribute both the 
widening gap between America's haves and have-nots and the 
erosion of a shared civic faith more to recent decay than to enduring 
systemic injustice. Second, they reinforce depreciation of social 
justice in their agenda by attributing the decline in morals in part to 
the success of movements aimed at reducing systemic inequalities and 
4. Civil socie ty revivalists also worry about a deception possibly created by their pretty 
package . See, e.g., E .J. Dionne, Jr. , Why Civil Society? Why Now? . in COMMUNITY WORKS: 
TH E REVIVAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN AMERICA 1, 1 (E.J. Dionne, Jr., ed., 1998) (" 'Civil society' 
sounds so nice that few people can believe something serious lies behind the debate the idea has 
provoked ."). I take very seriously the agenda behind the civil society revivalists ' nice words . 
5. Both A Call to Civil Society and A Nation of Specrators ret1ect this unde rlying morality. 
A Call to Civil Sociecy emphasizes the need for public moral re newaL while A Nation of 
Speccators is more concerned with increasing civic engagement. See Don Eberly, Civic Renewal 
vs. Moral Renewal, POL'Y REV. , Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 44. Despite these divergent priorities, 
however, both reports stress the importance of shared , public values to the civic health of the 
nation. Both consider from different vantages the re lationship be tween citizens' civic and 
ethical life. I am interested here in the moral vision that anima tes civil society revivalists' 
understanding of this relationship. 
6. This inattention to the impact that systemic racial exclusion has on civil society is 
contrary to the prior work of Cornel West, who signed A Call to Civil Sociecy. See generally 
CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993) . West's message that race matters is muted by the 
revivalists' overriding project of attributing the erosion of a shared civic fa ith to moral decline. 
See Cornel West, Nihilism in Black America, D ISSENT, Spring 1991, at 221 (attributing the 
erosion of Black civil society largely to a kind of mora l decay, including " the profound sense of 
psychological depression , personal worthlessness, and social despair"). The participation of 
several African Americans in drafting A Call to Civil Society does not refute my criticism. See 
Jean Bethke Elshtain , Will the Real Civil Society Advocates Please Stand Up?, 75 CHI.- KENT L. 
REV. 583, 586 (2000) (responding to my criticism by noting that " the Council on Civil Society 
included in its ranks distinguished African America n scholars an d activists."). My critique 
concerns the substance of the revivalists ' platform, not the credentials or race of its signa tories. 
Black social theorists have long disagreed about the causes, extent, and nature o.f racial 
inequality, as well as the strategies for combating it. See gen era!ly AFRICAN INTELLECTUAL 
HERITAGE (Mo!efi Kete Asa nte & Abu S. A barry eds ., 1996). Perhaps many of the revivalists 
are deeply troubled by racia l and other forms of systemic injustice , but their concern is muted 
by their overriding project of attributing the erosion of a shared civic fait h to moral decline. 
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by denouncing some of the movements' most effective tools. In the 
revivalists' moral universe, the focus on weakening morals eclipses 
the ugly reality of entrenched economic and social disparities. 
I then explain how the revivalists' association between equality 
and moral decline produces strategies that benefit and protect 
predominantly white middle-class families while devaluing the family 
ties of less privileged people. For one thing, these strategies rely 
excessively on ensuring that children are raised by parents who are 
married. By discounting the importance of social justice for creating 
civic faith, involvement, and solidarity, their proposals could do more 
to defend the social order than to renew civil society.7 
I. THE EXCLUSIVE MEANING OF MORALITY 
It is important to note at the outset that there is no ineluctable 
connection between the revivalists' exclusive understanding of 
morality and the role of civil society. The revivalists tend to conflate 
their peculiar definition of morality, and set of indicators of moral 
decline, with the meaning of civil society.8 But the moral standards 
animating civil society need not have anything to do with the 
condemnation of divorce and out-of-wedlock births. One can agree 
that democracy needs moral truths and that shared public values 
promote civic engagement, without subscribing to the particular 
moral truths espoused by the Institute for American Values. 
A sociological perspective on civil society recognizes that the 
shape it takes in any nation at any moment in history is influenced by 
prevalent cultural and political forces. 9 The Marxist perspective on 
7. For somewhat different reasons, Jean L. Cohen expresses a similar worry about the 
revivalists' conceptualization of civi l society: "Unless this model is corrected, the current revival 
of the discourse of civil socie ty in the United States will play into the hands of social 
conservatives who aim to re traditionalize civic life and to substitute loca l ' volunteerism' for the 
public se rvices and redistributive efforts of the welfare state , as if these are the only options we 
have. " J ean L. Cohen, American Civil Rights Talk, in CIVIL SOCIETY. D EMOCRACY, AND 
CIVIC RENEWAL 55-56 (Robert K. Fullinwider ed., 1999). Cohen argues that most revivalists 
incorrectly equate civil society with traditional forms of voluntary group associations, omitting 
the cruc ial category of the public sphere. See id. at 56, 67 ("[I]t is the link of the reductionist 
conception of civil society to the discourse of civic decline that makes this approach ambiguous, 
and so prone to ideological misuse."). 
8. Indeed, as Professor Elshtain 's indignant response illustrates, reviva lists seem offended 
by the suggestion of competing models of civil socie ty by those with ideological perspectives 
different from their own. See E lshtain , supra note 6, at 597-99 (accusing me of " readin g 
everything through a distorting ideological lens"). Of course ideological differences shape ideas 
about the culture and politics of civil society-A Call to Civil Society is hardly a neutral 
sta tement of moral values and policy choices! 
9. See Robert W. Hefner, Civil Society: Cultural Possibility of a Modern Ideal, SOCIETY, 
!Viar. -Apr. 1998, at 16. Americans used to revivalists' rhetoric of moral conformity might be 
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civil society expressed by Antonio Gramsci reveals further the 
political relevance of divergent discourses of civil society.10 As 
political scientist Jean Cohen describes it, "competing conceptions of 
civil society are deployed in a continual struggle either to maintain 
cultural hegemony by dominant groups or to achieve counter-
hegemony for subordinate collective actors."11 The very nature of 
civil society suggests that its ideals are never pre-determined or 
stagnant, but constantly refined through the process of citizen 
engagement.l2 "[I]t is less the beat of ancient associational drums that 
determines democracy's rhythms than it is a thoroughly 
contemporary circle of organizations and values," notes 
anthropologist Robert Hefner. 13 
In other words, there is nothing in the political function of civil 
society that necessitates the marriage-centered norms embraced by 
civil society's most vocal champions. We may reject their model of 
family structure, economic system, and social order, and still 
appreciate the benefits of civil society. My purpose in this essay is to 
point out the weakness of this moral ideology as a basis for civil 
society rather than to jettison the concept of civil society altogether. 
The question remains, does the particular moral vision promoted 
by today's revivalists foster civil society better than others? The point 
of moral renewal in civil society is not to establish a fixed set of 
preferred values enforced by the state. To the contrary, civil society 
is the sphere of culture that avoids state domination where values can 
be freely "debated, contested, and changed."14 Civil society adherents 
should be interested in fostering a public morality that will protect 
this arena of ethical life and promote civic involvement by all citizens. 
I hope to show that by excluding social justice from the center of its 
concern, the revivalists ' understanding of morality offends this basic 
surprised to learn that E aste rn European intellectuals were attracted to civil society's 
democratic pluralism. See Krishan Kumar, Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefuln ess of an 
Historical Term , 44 BJS 375, 375 (1993) . 
10. See Antonio Gramsci, State and Civil Society, in SELECTIONS FROM PRISON 
NOTEBOOKS 206 (1971 ). 
11. Cohen , supra note 7, at 57. 
12. See H efner, supra note 9, a t 26 ("[T]he values of civil socie ty are , by their very nature, 
eve r-unfinished. "); see also Cohen, supra note 7, at 57 (" [T]he cultural dimension of civil society 
is not given or na tural ; rather, it is a site of social contestation: its associations and ne tworks are 
a terrain to be struggled over, and an arena in which collective iden tities, e thical values, and 
alliances are forged. "). 
13. See Hefn er, supra note 9, a t 26. 
14. Kumar, supra note 9, at 383. 
2000] THE MORAL EXCL USIVITY OF THE NEW CIVIL SO CIETY 559 
tenet of democratic civility.15 
The revivalists do not ignore altogether America's social 
hierarchies and their attendant disparities of wealth and privilege. A 
Call to Civil Society, for example, emphasizes throughout the text that 
"we suffer from growing inequality. "16 Rather, at the heart of their 
moral exclusivity is a flawed understanding of the relationship 
between inequality and moral decline. The revivalists make two 
claims about this relationship. First, they assert that moral decline 
fosters inequality: growing disparities in Americans' material well-
being stem largely from gr?wing moral weaknesses in families and 
norms of personal responsibilityY Second, they associate equality 
with moral decline: dramatic advances by disenfranchised groups in 
the last forty years have contributed to the moral degeneration of 
families and other aspects of civic life. 18 This conception of the 
relationship between equality and moral decline discounts both the 
immorality of social inequities themselves, and the way social 
inequities hinder civic engagement. 
A. Moral Decline Causes Inequality 
A Call to Civil Society begins by linking two deficiencies in 
contemporary U.S. society: "First, we suffer from growing inequality. 
And second, we suffer from moral depletion. "19 Relying largely on 
public opinion polls, the report defines moral weakness as "behavior 
that threatens family cohesiveness . . . behavior that is increasingly 
uncivil-that reflects a rejection of legitimate authority and a lack of 
respect for others . . . [and] behavior that violates the norm of 
personal responsibility. "20 The revivalists then try to establish a 
causal connection between inequality and moral decline. They blame 
moral degeneracy for the material manifestations of economic and 
social injustice . Thus, A Call to Civil Society attributes a long list of 
social ills from declining child and adolescent well being, to high 
15. Although the civil society revivalists often posi tion themse lves against liberals, both 
have been guilty of setting aside social justice from their moral vision. I have e lsewhere 
criticized dominant liberal ideology fo r this omission . See D OROTHY E. R OBERTS, KILLING 
THE BLACK BODY 294 (1 997); see also D orothy E. R oberts, Social Justice, Procreative Liberty 
and th e Limits of Liberal Th eory: Robertson 's Children of Choice, 20 L. & Soc. INQU IRY l005 
(1995) (book rev iew). 
16. See COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOc'Y, supra note 1, at 4, 15, 26. 
17. See id. at 5-6. 
18. See infra notes 72-78 and accomp anying tex t. 
19. COUNClL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 4. 
20. !d. a t 5. 
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levels of violence and disorder, to worsening relations between races, 
economic classes, and generations to declining morality, rather than 
to inequalities of wealth and power.21 
Linking the ill effects of societal inequality to moral degeneracy 
shifts the focus from injustice to moral weakness and obscures 
inequality itself as one of U.S. society's chief immoralities. This move 
from inequality to moral decline is reflected in the revivalists' 
concrete strategies to restore civil society. The revivalists' 
recommendations barely recognize the moral imperative to reduce 
poverty or eliminate systemic racism, proposing such paltry efforts as 
establishing mentoring programs for juvenile offenders.22 Instead, 
they are primarily concerned with shifting authority over existing 
anti-poverty services from the federal government to institutions of 
civil society, such as local religious organizations. Although A Call to 
Civil Society acknowledges that "our economic activities and 
institutions are not exempt from the need for moral renewal," it does 
not make the transformation of economic relations a critical part of 
moral renewal.23 Under this view, moral restoration requires 
marriage, respect for authority, and personal responsibility, and these 
principles should help to govern the economic sphere. 
Civil society revivalists claim, then , that the widening gap in U.S. 
wealth and privilege is driven largely by moral decline, while failing to 
highlight our tolerance of this gap as itself immoral. The new civil 
society could just as well grow from a public morality that is more 
disgusted by persistent social inequities and a moral truth that makes 
social justice a chief concern. We could begin with the revivalists' 
fundamental principle that all persons possess equal dignity, their 
view of people as intrinsically social beings, and their aim to nurture a 
space for citizen engagement undominated by either the market or 
the state, yet prescribe a very different agenda. An alternative 
agenda might strengthen the institutions of civil society by aggressive 
efforts to relieve poverty and redress longstanding barriers to 
housing, jobs, and political participation. It might build solidarity 
around a commitment to engage in collective action for systemic 
change. 
So far I have described the civil society revivalists ' focus on 
moral decline and suggested an alternative moral vision that places 
21. Id. at 6. 
22. See id. at 21. 
23. !d. at 16. 
i 
J 
' 1 
j 
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social justice squarely at its center. But is there any reason for civil 
society to adopt this alternative definition of social morality? Social 
justice may be an important concern for any moral society, but it may 
be irrelevant or ancillary to the particular mission of civil society. 
There is strong evidence, however, that eliminating systemic 
inequality is an essential strategy for fostering civil society. As 
sociologist Caroline Hodges Persell puts it, " [ c ]ivil society and social 
justice are interdependent."24 Persell traces the decline in civil society 
in the last two decades to structural economic transformation in the 
United States that produced dramatic changes in income 
distribution.25 In the period from 1979 to 1989, for example , the 
richest 20% of households reaped 97% of economic gains while the 
bottom 20% saw a net decline in their share of earnings.26 More 
recent data show the gap between rich and poor is widening: "this 
year, the richest 2.7 million Americans, the top 1 percent, will have as 
many after-tax dollars to spend as the bottom 100 million."27 The 
richest one-fifth have a bigger share of the economic pie than they did 
in 1977, while the share of the one-fifth with the lowest incomes is 
smaller.28 
Persell argues that these economic inequalities are undermining 
civil society because "economic distress is negatively related to social 
capital. "29 Citing the empirical work of sociologists William Julius 
Wilson and Elijah Anderson, she points out the importance of decent 
jobs and economic security for family and community stability. 30 
Huge disparities in income, moreover, reinforce class divisions and 
make it harder for citizens to perceive that they share a common 
moral purpose.31 
There is also evidence that poverty, social isolation, and 
inadequate education reduce levels of political participation.32 A 
survey of Blacks in Detroit from different income levels showed that 
24. Caroline Hodges Persell, The Interdependence of Social Justice nnd Civil Society, 12 
Soc. F. 149, 154 (1997). 
25. See id. at 154-56. 
26. See id. at 154. 
27. David Cay Johnston, Gnp Between Rich and Poor Found Substantially Wider, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 5, 1999, at A14. 
28. See id. 
29. See Persell, supra note 24, at 158, 164. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. at 164. 
32. See Frederick C. Harris , Will the Circle Be Unbroken? The Erosion and Tmnsjomwtion 
of African American Civic Life, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC RENEWAL supra 
note 7, at 317, 329-34. 
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those living in poor neighborhoods were less likely to engage in civic 
activities, belong to a church, attend community meetings, or 
contribute money to political candidates.33 In Code of the Street 
' Elijah Anderson reveals a violently enforced set of informal rules-
the "code of the street"- that has replaced the rules of civil law in 
inner-city Philadelphia and competes with parents' attempts to train 
their children to be good citizens.34 The code of the street flourishes 
not because the residents are not decent enough, but because of their 
community's multiple deprivations: "a trying socioeconomic context 
in which family-sustaining jobs have become ever more scarce, public 
assistance has increasingly disappeared, racial discrimination is a fact 
of daily life, wider institutions have less legitimacy, legal codes are 
often ignored or not trusted, and frustration has been powerfully 
building for many residents."35 
Civil society revivalists dismiss the key role systemic inequality 
plays in weakening the institutions of civil society by artificially 
excluding the issue of social justice from their project. David 
Blankenhorn, for example, considers three alternative strategies that 
rich countries might adopt to strengthen civil society: a welfare state 
strategy based on government programs, a laissez-faire strategy based 
on free market incentives, and a strategy based directly on restoring 
the institutions of civil society.36 Blankenhorn recognizes certain 
advantages of the welfare state model that uses government measures 
to increase economic security and reduce economic inequalityY 
Despite its potential for state imperialism, the welfare state 
counteracts the deleterious influence of unconstrained market forces, 
which Blankenhorn suggests are partly responsible for the United 
States' distinction as "the modern world's weakest and most rapidly 
declining family system. "38 
Blankenhorn rejects the welfare state strategy, however, because 
it cannot perform the chief function of civil society: it cannot train 
33. See Cathy J. Cohen & Michael C. Dawson, Neighborhood Poverty and African 
American Politics, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 286, 297-98 (1993). 
34. See generally ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND 
THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY (1999). 
35. !d. at 11. 
36. David Blankenhorn, The Possibility of Civil Society, in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: 
SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERCIAN SOCIETY 271, 280 
(Mary Ann Glendon eta!. eels., 1995). 
37. See id. at 278. 
38. Jd.at278-79. 
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:::hildren to be good citizens.39 Jean Bethke Elshtain similarly 
:lismisses concern about social problems from the particular aims of 
:::ivil society: "Civil society isn't so much about problem solving as 
about citizen and neighbor creating. Then and only then will we work 
together on other desired ends."4° Civil society's job of forming good 
citizens becomes an excuse for setting aside systemic economic and 
social change from the revivalists' concrete policy recommendations.41 
But why must we view the welfare state as a substitute for civil 
society? And why must we view solving social problems as 
disconnected from the task of creating good citizens and neighbors? 
There is no need to choose between state institutions aimed at 
ameliorating disastrous economic disparities and the institutions of 
civil society. These two sets of institutions can complement each 
other. Theda Skocpol's study of the emergence of large voluntary 
groups m America, for example, demonstrates the historical 
importance of federal government programs in promoting civic 
activismY Skocpol observes, " [ c ]ontrary to the conservative view 
that federal social policies are harmful to voluntary groups, popularly 
rooted voluntary associations have often grown up in a mutually 
beneficial relationship with federal policies, including federal 'tax-
and-spend' programs."43 Local and federal efforts to achieve a more 
egalitarian society can facilitate a parallel mission to revitalize civil 
39. See id. at 279. 
40. Jean Bethke Elshtain , Not a Cure-All: Civil Society Creates Citizens, It Does Not Solve 
Problems, in COMMUNITY WORKS: THE REVIVAL OF CIVI L SOCIETY JN AMERICA 24. 27 (E.J. 
Dionne, Jr., ed., 1998). 
41. As the preceding discussion sho uld make apparent, the revivalists' insistence " that civil 
society is not primarily problem-oriented (the cure-all idea) but citizenship creating" has not 
eluded me as Professor Elshtain charges. See Elshtain , supra note 6, at 586. Rather, I argue 
that this distinction between problem solving and citizenship creation is not only artificial, but 
one the revivalists do not consistently embrace. Thus, they use this dichotomy selectively to 
dismiss national programs to redistribute wealth and privilege, while inviting government 
intervention, such as tax policy and welfare regulation , to promote marriage. See COUNCIL ON 
CIVIL Soc'Y, supra note 1, at 19, 20. A Call to Civil Society and A Nation of Spectators arc 
certainly oriented toward solving the problems of divorce and single parenting. Our 
disagreement , the n, is over which problems threaten civil socie ty the most. Similarly, the 
revivalists are no more concern ed about "actual conditions on the ground" than I am, although 
we may view these conditions differently. See id. My contention is that the revivalists ' atte ntion 
to fixing " moral decline " as distinct from "socia l problems" in the name of citizenship creatio n 
is both theoretically and empirica lly indefensible and may ultimately do civil society more harm 
than good. 
42. See Theda Skocpol , Don't Blame B ig Governmen£: America's Voluntary Groups Thri ve 
in a National Network , in COMM UN ITY WORKS: TH E R EVIVAL OF CIViL SOCIETY IN AM ERI CA , 
supra note 40, at 37. 
43. !d. at 39; see also Cohen , sup ra note 7, at 77 (" It is not necessa ry to choose be twee n an 
istitutionalist and an associa tiona list path to the crea tio n of social trust. These can be mutuall y 
interdependent and rein fo rcing. "). 
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society. This mission, moreover, must include solving social problems 
to create citizens with the ability and motivation to work together. 
Civil society revivalists overemphasize the significance of moral 
decline and underestimate the importance of social justice because of 
a profound misunderstanding of the depths and impact of social 
divisions in the United States. The revivalists blame moral decline for 
eroding our sense of common humanity. They assume that peeling 
away the layer of moral decay that accumulated over the past few 
decades will reveal a "common civic faith and shared moral 
philosophy."44 It is as if an acute dementia erased America's racist 
history and its persistent effects from the revivalists' memory. 
Only the foggiest romanticism could fondly recall "our political 
and social egalitarianism, which allowed individuals of all stations to 
mingle and work together in common endeavors. "45 For most of 
American history, Blacks were barred by law from civic participation, 
including voting, holding public office, and serving on juries;46 a rule 
of racial purity helped to preserve white supremacy.47 The colonists 
originally established a clear demarcation between Black slaves and 
white masters by a violently implemented system of racial 
classifications and sexual taboos. A paramount objective of 
American law and social convention was keeping the white bloodline 
free from Black contamination and excluding Blacks from the 
privileges of whiteness.48 This racial caste system was upheld by law 
for three centuries, officially discredited only in recent decades by 
44. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 26. 
45. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 1, at 39. 
46. See Kenneth L. Ka rst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the 
Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95 , 112-13. See generally Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U .S. 393, 412 (1857) ("[Blacks] have never been regarded as a part of the people of citizens of 
the Sta te, nor supposed to possess any political rights which the dominant race might not 
withhold or grant at the ir please." ); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM 
CROW 67-109 (3d ed. 1974) (describing the creation and implementation of Jim Crow statutes 
fo llowing Reconstruction); Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal 
History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1006-07 (1989) (discussing 
segregation in the public sphere). 
47. See A. Leon Higginbo tham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial 
Sex in the Law of Colonial Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1967-68 (1989). See 
generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAN, JR. , IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978) ; WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE 
OVER BLACK: AMERICAN A ITITUDES T OWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1 812 (1969). 
48. See Cheryl I. H arris, Whiteness as Property, 106 H ARV. L. REV. 1707, 1745-46 (1993) 
(describing the legal deve lopment of a "property interest in whiteness" that automat ica lly 
enti tles whites in the United States to a privileged status). On the laws that defined whiteness, 
see generally IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(1996) . 
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Supreme Court decrees such as Brown v. Board of Education49 
(overturning the separate but equal doctrine in 1954) and Loving v. 
Virginia50 (invalidating anti-miscegenation laws in 1967). 
Civil society revivalists forget that "the intellectual inheritance of 
our civilization" includes scientific racism, which justified this racial 
hierarchy, as much as the enlightenment principles of equality and 
freedom. Scientific racism understands racial variation as a biological 
distinction that determines social superiority and inferiority.51 It 
explains white domination of other races as the natural order of 
things. Only a theory rooted in nature could systematically account 
for the anomaly of slavery existing in a republic founded on a radical 
commitment to the ideals civil society revivalists admire. 52 
These are not isolated events from a distant past that we can 
regret and then put aside as we move forward to restore civil society. 
This history created a culture, established institutions, and instilled 
expectations of privilege based on a racial hierarchy that negated the 
possibility of civic solidarity across racial lines. Institutional barriers 
continue to hinder minorities' participation in the nation's economic 
and political life and a sense of common humanity. Under racist 
ideology, moreover, whites perceive their interests in opposition to 
those of Blacks because Blacks' social advancement diminishes white 
superiority. The jurisprudence of racial realism posits that white 
Americans have repeatedly sacrificed Black people's interests to 
maintain their privileged position; legal measures that improve 
African-Americans' status are implemented only if they also further 
the in terests of the white majority.53 Some people consider it uncivil 
for minorities to make demands for equal citizenship that do not 
appeal to whites' self interest. 54 
'Nhite Americans have therefore been unwilling to pay for 
subsidies and to engage in social reforms thought to benefit Blacks.55 
'Vhite workers resisted labor reform during Reconstruction that 
49. 347 U .S. 483, 495 (1954). 
50. 388 U.S .1 , 11-12 (1967). 
51. See STEPH EN JAY GOULD, THE M ISMEAS URE OF MAN 30-39 (1981). 
52. See Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race, and Ideology in 1he Uniled States of America, 
181 NEW LEFT R EV. 95 , 101-02, 106-07, 114 (1990). 
53. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE Bon·oM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM 97-99 (1992): see also Derrick A . Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the 
Interest-Convergence Dilemma , 93 H ARV. L REV. 518. 523 (1980). 
54. At a recent meeting of the American Society of Political and Legal Philosophy, 
Lawrence ]\;lead accused me of being "uncivil" because I made an argument based on racial 
justice that did not appeal to white people 's interests . 
55. See B ELL, supra note 53, at 8. 
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would have incorporate_d freed slaves i?to the labor market.56 Nearly ·.;: ,~: 1 
a century later, a white backlash dismantled the 1960s War on · _;;.;j 
Poverty programs when they began to improve the material status - :: ~ 
and increase the political power of the Black urban poorY This racial .· :.~ 
antipathy does not bode well for renewing a shared civic purpose: J 
For centuries in this country ... blacks have served as the group 
whose experiences and private needs have been suppressed in 
order to promote "the common good" of whites. Indeed, the 
"shared values" in which the antifederalists laid faith included a 
historically constant and (for whites) a unifying belief in the inferior 
and subordinated position of black Americans. 58 
The common good is an elusive ideal when one group defines its 
welfare in terms of the continued subordination of another. 59 
These racial attitudes pervade every aspect of U.S. civil society. 
Just as strong as white Americans' "proclivity to associate" is their 
proclivity to disassociate from Blacks. The most graphic reflection of 
this racial separation is persistent residential segregation. In 
A merican Apartheid, Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A . Denton 
demonstrate that the concentration of poor Blacks in urban centers 
resulted from systemic racial discrimination in the public and private 
housing markets. 60 The geographic isolation of Blacks in inner-cities 
has profound civic consequences. As Margaret Weir explains , "it 
transforms the problems of living in cities into 'black' problems, 
making it easier for politicians to solve urban problems at the expense 
of poor black residents."61 Massey and Denton tie residential 
56. See WI LLIA M EDWARD B URGHARDT D UBOIS. BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN 
AMERICA 700 (1962). 
57. See JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: H OW R AC ISM UNDERMINES THE 
W AR ON POVERTY 78, 195-96 (1994) . 
58. Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE LJ. 
1609, 1610-11 (1 988) . 
59. Even progressive refo rme rs have advocated race-neutra l programs in ho pes tha t they 
can garne r more suppo rt from white A me ricans than th e vilif ied welfa re program s the public 
associates with B lack people . See, e.g. , LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE 
MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF W ELFARE, 1890-1 935, a t 304-05 (1994) (cri ticizing ta rge ted 
welfare polic ies and noting that "a bigger welfa re state is like ly to be a m o re pop u lar one"); 
W ILLIAM JULI US WI LSON, THE TRU LY D ISADVANTAGED: TH E INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC P OLICY 120 (1987) (" The hidden agenda is to improve the life 
chances of groups such as rhe ghetto underc/ass by emphasizing p rograms in which the more 
advantaged groups of all races can positively relate." ). I critique these universalist appeals in 
R oberts, supra no te 3, at 1588-92. 
60. DOUGLASS. MASSEY & NANCY A DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 51-59, 96-105 
(1993). 
61. Margare t We ir, From Equal Opportunity to "The New Social Contrau ": Race and the 
Poli1ics of rhe American "Underc/ass," in R ACISM, THE CITY AND T HE STATE 93 (Malcolm 
Cross & M ichael Keith eds ., 1993) . 
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segregation to Blacks' extreme economic, social, and political 
isolation from mainstream society and to the resulting endurance of 
_Black poverty. The authors' striking observation about the 
unparalleled degree of Blacks' exclusion from white civic life should 
send chills up any civil society revivalists' spine: "Ironically, within a 
large, diverse, and highly mobile post-industrial society such as the 
. United States, blacks living in the heart of the ghetto are among the 
most isolated people on earth. No other group in the contemporary 
United States comes close to this level of isolation within urban 
society. "62 
This American apartheid was not a natural or inevitable 
consequence of benign racial preferences. These impoverished 
ghettos were consciously created by white real estate brokers and 
banks, supported by antiblack violence, federal housing policy, and 
legal rules such as restrictive covenants.63 To this day, racial 
discrimination in mortgage lending and real estate sales helps to 
maintain housing segregation.64 
Elshtain responds to "Accusations of Nostalgia," such as mine, 
by pointing out that she is well aware that "many bad things 
happened and are happening in America."65 The problem is not that 
civil society revivalists do not know the awful history of slavery, the 
annihilation of Native Americans, and women's second-class status, 
however. It is that they deliberately ignore this history in describing 
America's civic past and the potential for civic renewal. They rely on 
this amnesia to set aside the need for structural change in favor of 
reversing moral decline. Elshtain hurls the charge of nostalgia back 
at progressives who stubbornly refuse to relinquish their faith in 
federal government to solve social problems.66 They should also come 
to grips with the fact that "not all our problems are fixable," she 
admonishesY The degree of tolerance we have for gross disparities in 
wealth and privilege-the extent to which we believe these problems 
are fixable-is a matter of moral conviction. Civic revivalists 
advocate an exclusive morality that seeks to repair America's moral 
deficiencies such as divorce and personal irresponsibility while 
62. MASSEY & D ENTON , supra note 60, at 77. 
63. See i~ at17-59,87. 
64. See Keith Bradsher, A Second Fed Bank Sw dy Finds Disparities in Mortgage Lending, 
N.Y. TI MES, July 13, 1995, at D1 ; see also Peter T. Kilborn , Bias Worsens for Minorities Buy ing 
Homes. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1999, at Al 5. 
65. Elshtain , supra no te 40, at 24 , 26. 
66. /d. at 27. 
67. !d. 
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lacking the conviction to challenge an unjust social order. 
Another response to the problem that racism poses for civil 
society might emphasize the development of Black civic institutions 
and associations that do not rely on white people's assistance or 
approval. As Regina Austin wisely advocates: 
Although blacks must resist white supremacy at every turn, blacks 
should also recognize the inadequacy of the concessions white 
supremacy is likely to accord them and proceed on the assumption 
that they must generate and sustain a black public sphere, that is, a 
space in which they can pursue the good life both in spite of white 
people and without regard to them.68 
This model of separate civic arenas is more realistic, although it 
may not be what most revivalists had in mind. But the commitment 
to building independent Black institutions of civil society need not 
negate the pursuit of systemic economic and social change in 
America. Black communities currently lack the resources needed to 
raise the masses of Black people out of poverty. Without a radical 
objective, moreover, Black localism may simply accommodate the 
prevailing social order. At the inception of the War on Poverty, for 
example, whites found the concept of "community development" 
reassuring because "they understood it to mean that the assault would 
be on the 'pathology of the ghetto,' not on white stakes in 
neighborhoods, schools, jobs, or public services. "69 Strengthening 
Black civic life is important, but, just like the rest of civil society, this 
effort must seek to abolish America's systemic injustices. 
The history of institutionalized racial exclusion, reinforced by a 
white supremacist ideology, suggests that any effort to improve civic 
engagement and social connectedness must place at its center the 
eradication of racial and other social stratifications. The lesson to be 
learned from the Founders is that their "moral idea that all persons 
possess equal dignity" was strangled by their practice of holding 
human beings in bondage.70 Their hypocrisy, along with racism's 
intransigence, should counsel against the naive faith in the moral 
power of these ideals alone to bring about a civil society. By 
68. Regina A ustin , Beyond Black Demons & White Devils: Antiblack Conspiracy 
Theoriz ing & the B lack Public Sphere, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv . 1021 , 1042-43 (1 995) ; see also 
Regina Austin , "An Honesr Living": Street Vendors, J'v!unicipal Regulation, and the Black Public 
Sph ere , 103 Y ALE L.J. 2119, 2119-20 (1994) . Austin 's advice echoes Malco lm X 's exhortation 30 
years ago that Blacks were "wasting (their) time appealing to the moral conscie nce of a 
bankrup t man like Uncle Sam." MALCO LM X SPEAKS 40 (George Breitman ed., 1965). 
69. FRANCES FOX PIVEN & R ICHARD A. C LOWARD. REGULATING THE POOR: THE 
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 276 (197 1). 
70. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOc'Y, supra note 1. at 13. 
i 
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constantly referring to a mythical shared civic past, the revivalists 
pretend that today's inequalities are caused by a recent decline in 
morals. Their writings read like a monumental effort to avoid having 
to confront the immorality of America's racist and unequal social 
order. The revivalists need to get a grip: There will be no common 
civic faith , no shared moral philosophy, no sense of common 
humanity in America unless it is forged in a struggle for social justice. 
B. Equality Causes Moral Decline 
The exclusion of social justice from the revivalists' moral center 
is bolstered by the habit of contrasting gains in social equality with 
civic virtue. Proponents of civil society accuse civil rights movements 
of contributing to the breakdown of civil society. In Liberal 
Purposes , William Galston suggests a correlation between civil rights 
and moral decay: "Although the civil rights movement is widely 
acknowledged to have righted ancient wrongs, epidemics of crime, 
drugs, and teenage pregnancy have exacted a fearful toll. "71 The final 
report of the National Commission on Civic Renewal opens by 
contrasting increased economic opportunity with the country's 
troubling civic and moral condition.72 The report acknowledges 
briefly the link between economic misery and civic ills only to 
discount its importance.73 The authors ' point is to distinguish between 
civic and economic health and to place virtue and civic action above 
economic well-being.74 
Civil society revivalists count declines in morality and social 
capital as a cost exacted by improvements in economic and social 
equality. They tend to balance advances made by women and 
minorities against the social harms caused by civic disengagement and 
moral disorder. Thus, James Q. 'Nilson weighs the abolition of 
slavery and segregation as well as increased gender equity "against . .. 
the increased tolerance of drug experimentation, the social 
marginalization of religious believers, the heightened skepticism 
about institutional authority, and a certain confusion over sexual 
roles. "75 Robert Putnam similarly offers a "rounded assessment of 
71. W ILLIAM A. G ALSTON, LIBERAL P URPOSES: GOODS, V IRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN 
THE L IBERAL STATE 273 (1991) . G a lston has a habit of pointing out the limits of struggles fo r 
racia l equa li ty. 
72. NATIONAL COIVIM'N ON CIVIC R ENEWAL, sup ra note 1, at 5. 
73. See id. at 5-6. 
74. See id. a t 7 . 
75 . J AMES Q. WILSON, Liberalism, Modernism , and rlz e Good Life , in SEEDBEDS OF 
J 
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changes in American social capital over the last quarter-century" that ,~ 
"counts the costs as well as the benefits of community engagement."76 · ~ 
He claims that the substantial decline in intolerance and overt 11 
discrimination in recent decades "may be related in complex ways to 1 
the erosion of traditional social capital. "77 ·-~~ 
In addition, civil society revivalists devalue tools that ' j l disempowered people have used successfully to achieve greater ··1 
inclusion in the social, economic, and political life of the nation. First i 
the revivalists rarely list social movements among the kinds of 1 
voluntary associations that constitute civil society.78 Some \ 
affirmatively disparage them.79 Yet these associations of citizens who 
struggled to make government more democratic were themselves 
marvelous examples of civil society. More than most voluntary 
groups, they were born from "the urge to which democratic civility 
responds": the yearning for participation and self-determination.so 
Social movements served as classic seedbeds of political activism and 
civic engagement, providing "oppositional space"81 for citizens to join 
together to challenge state domination. 
Paying more attention to voluntary groups that work outside the 
dominant political apparatus highlights the important role of civil 
society in struggles for self-determination and freedom. Because they 
were excluded from both state-sanctioned and market sources of 
social capital, Black Americans had to form their own intermediate 
associations to make ends meet, to confront racial injustice, and to 
agitate for inclusion. Political scientist Fredrick Harris describes the 
VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERCIAN SOCIETY, 
supra note 36, at 17, 29. 
76. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. 
DEMOCRACY 65, 75 (1995). 
77. !d. 
78. See Cohen, supra note 7, a t 69 (criticizing civic society revivalists for "discount[ing] the 
new types of association, mobilization, and public engagement of the 1960s and 1970s, simply 
because they differ from traditional secondary associations" ); Harris, supra note 32, at 321 ("An 
important omission in the civic renewal debate is the role social movements play in the nation's 
civic life ."). See, e.g. , COUNCIL FOR CIVIL SOc'Y, supra note 1, at 8-9 (listing "book clubs, Little 
League, the Future Farmers of America, the Kiwanis Club, the Girl Scouts, the Chamber of 
Commerce, the Advertising Council. and the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People" as current examples of voluntary civic organizations). 
79. See, e.g., E lshtain, supra note 40, at 27-28 (criticizing movement politics as "inherently 
unstable, ephemeral, and geared toward publicity" and arguing that "decent" institutions are 
preferable for building civic ties). 
80. Hefner, supra note 9, at 27. 
81. Jane Mansbridge, Us ing Power/Fighting Power: The Polity, in DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 46-47 (Seyla Banhabib ed ., 
1996) (describing "deliberative enclaves of resistance" ). 
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dual function of Blacks' "oppositional civic culture": "[w]hile the 
culture and institutions of marginal citizens perform [a traditional] 
. civic role, they also transmit values that counter the dominant 
society's ideology of subordination, and they employ these values to 
justify and legitimize oppositional movements."82 Black churches, 
social clubs, and grass-roots political organizations have cultivated 
norms that both support the dominant civic order and subvert its 
white supremacist features. 
Blacks have emphasized the civic role of their families as well: 
while menial work outside the home was historically an aspect of 
racial subjugation, the family was a site of solace from white 
oppression.83 Sociologists have also noted the importance of Black 
families in preparing children to survive in a racist society by teaching 
them a positive cultural identity that defies the racist stereotypes so 
rampant in the dominant culture.84 The practice of informal adoption 
within the extended kinship network became a common mechanism 
for Black families to rear children under difficult circumstances 
without interference by the state.85 It is unfortunate that the 
revivalists' myopic focus on the marital family eclipses the many ways 
in which Black families, who are less likely than whites to fit this 
model, have served a classically civic function. 
Black Americans' reason for participating in these civic projects 
have much more to do with mistrust of the government, mainstream 
social institutions, and institutionalized norms than the "civic trust" 
that the revivalists exalt. For Blacks, observes Harris, "distrust in 
82. Harris, supra note 32, at 323-24. Robert Putnam, a leading civil society revivalist, 
acknowledges that " [i]t would be a dreadful mistake, of course, to overlook the repositories of 
social capital within America's minority communities," emphasizing the power of the church as 
a resource for political engagement among Blacks. Robe rt D . Putnam , The Prosperous 
Community: Social Capital and Public Life , AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1993, at 35, 40; see also DON 
S. BROWNING, Altruism, Civic Virtue, and Religion , in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF 
COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AN D CITIZENSHIP IN AM ERCIAN SOCIETY, supra note 36, at 120-
26 (describing how a Black Pentecostal church promotes civic virtue and engagement in a 
Chicago ne ighborhood). 
83. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WorviEN , RA CE & CLASS 17 (1983); see also JACQUELINE 
JONES , LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FATVIILY 
FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 12-13 (1985 ). 
84. See, e.g. , Janice Hale, The Black Woman and Child-Rearing, in THE BLACK WOMAN 
79, 80 (La F rances Rodgers-Rose ed., 1980); JOYCE A. LADNER, MIXED FAMIL!ES: ADOPTING 
ACROSS RA CIAL BOUNDARIES (1977). 
85. See ANDREW BILLINGSLEY, CLIMBING JACOB 'S LAD DER: THE ENDURING LEGACY 
OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILIES 29-35 (1992); ELMER P. MARTIN & JOANNE MITCH ELL 
MARTIN, THE BLACK EXTENDED FAMILY 5-16 (1978); CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KI N: 
STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVALIN A BLACK COMMUNITY 44-47,92-94 (1974). 
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government has had a paradoxical link to CIVIC engagement."86 
Research consistently shows that Blacks quite understandably have 
higher levels of mistrust toward government institutions than most 
Americans.87 But this skepticism about the government generated an 
intensity of Black political activism in the 1950s and 1960s that 
surpassed that of whites.88 Given the mediating function served by 
voluntary associations, mistrust is a perfectly legitimate motivation to 
draw citizens together for civic engagement.89 
How, then, can the revivalists pit the civil rights and women's 
movements in opposition to civil society? These struggles seem to be 
disqualified from the revivalists' place of honor because they used 
disruptive tactics like boycotting businesses and joining protest 
marches rather than more "civil" tools like voting (from which Blacks 
and women were once officially barred) and forming recreational 
clubs. More important, these social movements sought to radically 
change the social order and achieved a modicum of success. The 
revivalists' version of civil society, on the other hand, leaves the social 
order intact while concentrating on moral decay. 
Moreover, civil society revivalists denounce both the assertion of 
rights and federal court decrees that provide long-term oversight of 
rights enforcement. They slight the effective use of rights by 
disenfranchised groups to rebel against social degradation and 
demand recognition as full members of society. As Patricia vVilliams 
explains: "For the historically disempowered, the conferring of rights 
is symbolic of all the denied aspects of their humanity: rights imply a 
86. Harris, supra note 32, at 20. 
87. See id. For a discussion of differing racial attitudes about the criminal justice system, 
see generally KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL H OAXES, WHITE 
FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 
(1998). 
88. See Harris, supra note 32, at 20; see also Richard D. Shingles, Black Consciousness and 
Political Parricipation: The Missing Link, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 76, 76 (1981). Black 
Americans, on the other hand, have shown an incredible faith in the constitutional principles of 
equality and freedom. On the paradox of Blacks ' fidelity to the Constitution, see Dorothy E. 
Roberts, The !'v!eaning of Blacks ' Fidelity to Lhe Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, 
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES 226 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds ., 1998) 
("Blacks have no reason to have faith in the Constitution that was designed to exclude them; yet 
they have remained faithful to the Constitution in the struggle for citizenship by relentlessly 
demanding that its interpretation live up to its highest principles and follow its strictest 
requirements."). 
89. Even middle-class citizens may be motivated by mistrust. Katha Foilitt notes th a t she 
and her neighbors joined the Parent Teacher's Association ·'to keep our kids from being shafted 
by the school system." Katha Pollitt , For Whom the Ball Rolls, NATION, Apr. 15, 1996, at 9. 
Pollitt also astutely adds, however, that the elite have good reason to trust the system: "[F]or 
them, the system works. It 's made them rich and famo us." .ld. 
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respect that places one in the referential range of self and others, that 
elevates one's status from human body to social being."90 
In addition, the revivalists' emphasis on localism minimizes the 
important role played by federal courts in dismantling official systems 
of racial discrimination. To be sure, federally-enforced integration 
strategies have failed to overturn structural impediments to change 
and have devalued independent Black institutions and culture.91 
Federal court and legislative remedies are no substitute for 
community organizing. Indeed, it was grass roots agitation during the 
civil rights movement that spurred the federal government into 
action. But one wonders whether the upheavals of the 1960s could 
have taken place without social movements, rights assertion, and 
federal court intervention in local white supremacist governments. 
The revivalists' disdain for these tools deployed by subordinated 
groups in their liberation struggles only reinforces the sense that the 
new civil society cares little for the radical ends these groups sought 
to achieve. Linking moral decline and equality in these ways not only 
evades social cleavages; it may intensify them. This way of thinking 
mimics the age-old pattern of attributing the deprivation of 
disenfranchised groups to their own moral depravity, rather than to 
societal inequalities.92 Since the 1920s, sociologists have pointed to 
the degeneracy and disintegration of the Black family to explain 
Black poverty, crime, and unemployment. 93 Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
notoriously popularized this thesis in 1965. He described Black 
culture as a "tangle of pathology" and declared, "[a]t the heart of the 
deterioration of the fabric of the Negro society is the deterioration of 
the Negro family." 94 Putting moral decline in the spotlight obscures 
90. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RI GHTS 153 (1991). Other 
Black legal scholars have disagreed with white critical legal studies scholars over the significance 
of rights. See, e.g., Anthony E. Coo k, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive 
Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 H ARV. L. REv. 985, 992 (1990); Kimberle W. 
Cre nshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and L egitimation in 
A ntidiscriminarion Law, 101 H ARV. L. R EV. 1331 , 1357 (1988) (a rguing tha t liberal lega l 
ideology "remains receptive to some aspira tions that are central to B lack demands, and may 
also pe rform an important function in combating the e xpe rience of be ing excl uded and 
oppresse d"). 
91. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE E LUSIVE Q UEST FOR R ACIAL 
J USTICE 102, 107·18 (1987) ; see also John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner 
Commission Report: A Back-to-the-Fwure Essay , 71 N .C. L. RE V. 1487, 1496-1501 (1 993). 
92. See JOEL F. H ANDLER & Y EHESKEL HAS ENFELD, TH E M ORAL CONSTR UCTI ON OF 
P OVERTY: WELFARE R EFORM IN A MERICA 132 (1991 ). See generally MICHAE L B. KATZ, THE 
UN DESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE (1 989). 
93. See generally JOHN DOLLARD , CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN (1 937). 
94. OFFICE OF P OLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH, U NITED STATES DEP'T OF L ABOR, 
THE N EGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 5 (1965 ). 
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the need for structural reform. It may build resentment against 
subordinated groups who are often painted as irresponsible and 
undeserving, and it may fortify privileged people in their resolve to 
maintain the status quo. 
II. WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE NEW CIVIL SOCIETY 
The devaluation of social justice in the revivalists' moral vision 
creates another type of exclusion. The revivalists' strategies to 
implement their public values benefit privileged groups the most and 
disadvantage those at the bottom. As Robert Hefner learned from 
studying the modern European experience with civil society, the 
failure to attend to the "institutional nest that supports democratic 
civility" tends to produce segmentary freedoms that are enjoyed by 
only a portion of the populace.95 The revivalists' agenda reflects a 
stratified approach to state coercion in citizens' lives that parallels its 
exclusive moral vision.96 The revivalists' moral exclusivity affects the 
extent to which they see state interference in citizens' lives as an 
appropriate means of fostering civil society. Revivalists promote civil 
society's function of avoiding a state-dominated existence for citizens 
who conform to their moral ideology. On the other hand, they 
overlook or even advocate state regulation of non-conforming 
citizens. 
This second form of exclusivity especially structures civil society 
revivalists' recommendations for the family. Revivalists highlight the 
degeneration of child-raising families as the most pernicious of civic 
ills.97 Under many conceptions of civil society, the family is "the most 
95. See Hefner, supra note 9, at 17-26. Hefner attributes the lack of concern for 
sociological realism in the recent academic renewal of interes t in civil society to its origins in 
political philosophy rather than sociology or anthropology. 
96. Or maybe the revivalists have just jumped on the prevailing po litica l bandwagon, 
recognizing that "any project that entails government acting in the broad national interest 
(ra ther than in the narrower inte rest of the suburban middle class) probably won't get done." 
Nicholas Lemann. The New A merican Consensus: Government of, by and fo r the Comfortable: 
The Smallness of Centrism , N.Y. TIMES MAG ., Nov. 1, 1998, a t 37, 41. The civil society agenda 
fits nicely into the new D emocratic-R epublican politics that appeals primarily to suburban 
fam ilies by supporting "mainly low-cost government initiatives that signal empathy with middle-
class families who felt embattled, in the social rather than economic sense: the V-chip to screen 
ou t Internet pornograph y, extended family leave, school uniforms. " !d. at 42. I am indebted to 
Dan Lewis for bringing to my attention the rev ivalists' affinity for this politica l consensus. 
97. See, e.g., Ma ry Ann Glendon , Forgotten Questions , in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES 
OF COMPETENCE, CH ARACTER, AND CITIZENSHI P IN AMERCIAN SOCIETY, supra note 36, at 1, 
3 (" (T]he simultaneous weakening of child-raising fa milies and their surrounding and 
supporting institutions constitutes our culture's mos t serious long- term problem."). 
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fundamental form of social capital,"98 and one of the principal 
associations that shield the individual from the power of the state. 
This is a fairly uncontroversial tenet of civil society philosophy. 
Forces that weaken families, then, threaten the health of civil society; 
addressing these forces should be an important goal for public policy 
in a civil society. Civil society revivalists take this proposition one 
controversial step further by identifying divorce and single parenting 
as the chief agents of family degeneration and by prescribing 
marriage as the cure.99 Underlying this diagnosis is the norm of the 
heterosexual nuclear family. 
Civil society revivalists place marriage at the center of their 
agenda as the essence of family virtue and the ideal context for the 
moral education of children.l00 A Call to Civil Society elevates the 
marriage bond to "the first and most important gift we give to our 
children." 101 The Index of National Civic Health includes divorce and 
non-marital births as the only family components used to measure 
civic well-being. 102 Even if we agree that marriage provides certain 
advantages to children (a highly disputed claim),103 can it really be the 
virtually singular means for a civil society to strengthen families? 
Certainly there are many other ways in which family ties are 
weakened besides divorce and unwed childbearing. By singling out 
the decline in marriage, civil society revivalists minimize sources of 
family insecurity that stem more directly from social inequalities, such 
98. Putnam, supra note 76, at 73. 
99. See Harris, supra note 32, at 321 (" An important omission in the civic renewal debate is 
the ro le social movements play in the nation 's civic life. "); see also CO UNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, 
supra note 1, a t 18; NATION AL COMM'N ON CIVIC R ENEWAL, supra note 1, a t 13. 
100. See, e.g., David Blankenhorn , The Possibility of Civil Society , in SEE DBEDS OF VIRTUE: 
SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERC IAN SOCIETY, supra 
note 36, at 271, 280. ("The centerpiece goal of a civil socie ty stra tegy should be to strengthen 
marriage as a social institution- to increase the proportion of children who grow up with two 
married pare nts and decrease the proportion who do not. "). 
101. COUNCIL ON CIVIL Soc'Y, supra note 1, a t 19; see also Blankenh orn, supra note 100, at 
280 ("The centerpiece goal of a civil society strategy should be to strengthe n marriage as a social 
institution - to increase the proportion of children who grow up with two married parents and 
decrease the proportion who do not. ") . 
102. See N ATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC R ENEWAL, supra note 1, at 24. 
103. See generally LOST FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF FATHERLESSNESS IN AMERICA 
(Cynthia R. Daniels ed., 1998) (collecting dive rge nt points of view about the impact of 
fath e rlcssness on children and social order). Judith Stacey, for example , asserts th a t "the claim 
that social scientists have achie ved a co nsensus on the dange rs of fath erlessness . . . is 
categorically false. " Judith Stacey, Dada-ism in th e 1990s: Getting Past Baby Talk Abuut 
Fath erlessness, in LOST FATHERS THE POLITICS OF FATHERLESSN ESS IN AM ERICA, supra , at 64. 
No social science research has demonstrated "or even attempted to demo nstrate" that children 
living in radica lly diverse "fath erless" family structures have a grea ter risk of being inadequately 
parented than children raised by hete rosexu al married couples . !d. at 66. 
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as family poverty, removal of children from their parents by the state, 
and domestic violence. 
The revivalists also fail to sufficiently interrogate the relationship 
between marriage and economic inequality, and its implications for 
public policy. Social science research linking single motherhood to 
negative outcomes for children, such as poverty and delinquency, is 
subject to differing causal interpretations.104 The revivalists hold that 
these outcomes are caused by family structure rather than by 
difficulties experienced by female-headed households arising from 
gender, race, and economic inequities. Nor do civil society revivalists 
sufficiently attend to . the economic reasons for the decline in 
marriage. Chronic poverty is not conducive to forming stable marital 
bonds. The stresses and dislocations of unemployment make 
sustained partnerships difficult; jobless men do not make attractive 
husbands. William Julius Wilson makes a convincing case that high 
rates of Black female-headed households are tied directly to Black 
male unemployment, which is more than double that of whites, along 
with changing norms concerning marriage. 105 
Moreover, Black fathers' inability to contribute financially to 
their families does not improve with marriage. Asserting that 
marriage is the most efficacious solution to Black child poverty only 
masks the shameful facts about Black Americans' unequal economic 
status. 
In reality, the correlation between race and poverty overshadows 
the correlation between fatherlessness and poverty. A Black child 
whose father is present is still likely to fare worse than a white child 
raised by a single mother. In other words, racial inequality, "not 
:fatherlessness," is the leading cause of Black children's deprivation. 
Pretending that Black poverty is the fault of absent Black fathers 
provides a defense against addressing America 's institutionalized 
racism.106 
104. See gen erally LOST FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF FATHERLESSNESS IN At-.·IER!CA, supra 
note 103. For another refut ation of negative claims about fa therlessness, see generally NANCY 
E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES (1997). 
105. See WILSON, supra note 59, at 120-21; see also WILLLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN 
WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996). 
106. Dorothy Roberts. The Absent Black Far her, in LOST fATHERS: THE P OLITICS OF 
FATHERLESSNESS JN AM ERICA. supra note 103. at 157 (relying on SARA M CLANAHAN & 
GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WlTH A SINGLE PARENT: W HAT H URTS, WHAT HELPS 85 
(1 994)). McLanahan and Sandefur observe: " It is important to remember that Black children in 
two-parent families have much higher poverty rates th an white children in single-parent 
families. Hence, if there were no single-parent families, Black children would still have much 
higher pove rty rates than white children." MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra at 85. 
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Regulating families to make them conform to the marital norm is 
no substitute for a more equitable distribution of wealth and 
privilege. A civil society agenda, then, would more effectively 
strengthen families "including, but not limited to, marital ones" by 
including strategies that more directly remedy gender, economic and 
racial inequality. 
By promoting a particular family type, moreover, the revivalists 
indirectly weaken families that do not fit their mold. Their policy 
recommendations that reward marriage, such as tax code reforms, 
penalize parents who are not married.107 Even if they do not intend it, 
praising marriage as the only virtuous environment for raising 
children stigmatizes female-headed families. It diverts resources 
away from the very households that need them most. As women's 
studies professor Judith Stacey argues, "[m]ost social science 
evidence, like common sense ... suggests that the chief handicaps 
unwed mothers face are deficits of time, money, and social 
support . .. deficits for which there are much better social remedies 
than moral opprobrium."108 Civil society revivalists are banking on 
the reestablishment of marriage to cure these handicaps at some 
future date. In the meantime, their virtual abandonment of non-
marital families overlooks the civic function these parents are 
currently struggling to perform. 
As already suggested, the revivalists ' exclusive family agenda has 
a distinct race and class bias. Its proposed mechanisms for rewarding 
parental care benefit primarily middle-class families who earn enough 
to take advantage of them. At the same time that the revivalists 
advocate tax perks for middle-class, stay-at-home moms, welfare 
reform discourse vilifies poor mothers who care for their children at 
home as new state laws push them into the workforce, often without 
adequate child care.109 Far from reaping government benefits for 
spending more time with their children , these mothers are severely 
sanctioned if they fail to meet a host of job-related requirements.110 
107. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 19. 
108. Stacey, supra note 103, at 70. 
109. See G WENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S E ND 103-14 (1998). 
110. Sheryl! Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and rh e Min ority Poo r: Accounting fo r th e 
Tyranny of Sw 1e Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 604-05 (1999) ("The vas t majo rity o f sta tes 
now permit narrower exemptions from work requirements ... and they now impose stricter 
sanctio ns for non-compliance with the work requireme nt than were imposed under the old 
regime. " ); Barbara Vobejda & Judith Havemann, Sanclions: A Force Behind Falling Welfare 
Rolls; Srates A re Cutting Off Tens of Thousands Who Don 't Seek Wo rk or Follow Rules, WASH. 
POST, March 23, 1998, at A 1. 
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Yet civil society revivalists make no mention of these welfare reform , 
measures deliberately designed to disadvantage "at-home parentai .t; 
care of children. "111 The only recognition of welfare reform comes in 
the suggestion that governors and state legislatures use publi~ " 
assistance programs to promote marriage. 112 This version of civil 
society not only devalues the parent-child relationship in poor· 
female-headed homes, but encourages state intrusion in these home~ "' 
to promote official moral standards. · ' 
Finally, civil society revivalists advocate measures that will 
"enhance parental authority in the upbringing of children. "113 Whose • 
parental authority? Dramatic changes in policies governing public · j 
assistance and child welfare are converging to increase state · i 
supervision of poor children, especially those who are Black.114 Yet · 1 
the revivalists seem oblivious to these trends. In addition to rules 1 
promoting work, new welfare measures condition public aid on l 
parents' compliance with a variety of rules regarding children.l15 j 
These indigent parents are subject to a level of state interference in I 
i 
child raising that middle-class parents would never tolerate and that · 1 
violates basic tenets of civil society. 
Given the revivalists' inattention to systemic inequality, it comes 
as no surprise that the only recommendation related to the child 
welfare system (a system that regulates poor families almost 
exclusively) is to strengthen and expand the institution of adoption, 
including trans-racial adoption.116 Adoption is an important 
institution in civil society, revivalists argue, because it insures more 
children will grow up with two married parents. 117 By choosing to 
bolster adoption without mentioning programs that preserve the 
families of children in foster care, the revivalists favor the more 
privileged adoptive parents. Apparently, parents whose children 
have been removed by the state are less deserving of social support 
11 1. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, a t 19. 
112. See id. at 20. 
113. !d. at 23. 
114. See infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text; see also Gwendolyn Mink, Aren't Poor 
Single Mothers Women?: Feminists, Welfare Reform, and Welfare Juscice , in WHOSE WELFARE? 
171, 172 (Gwe ndolyn Mink ed. , 1999) (noting that welfare work requirements deny poor 
mothers parental choices about whether and how much outside employment is compatible with 
the needs of children). 
115. See Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform 
Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 719 (1992). 
116. See COUNCIL ON CIVIL S OC'Y, supra note 1, at 26: see also NATIONAL COMM'N ON 
CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 1, at 13 (advocating "sweeping away impediments to adoption"). 
117. See COUNCIL ON C IVIL SOC' Y, supra note 1, at 26. 
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because they are less likely to be married. But adoption should be a 
·":· · last resort for addressing child neglect and deprivation in a civil 
;·r _· society. Of course the state has a duty to protect children from harm 
within families, and should usually facilitate the adoption of children 
whose family ties have been irremediably fractured. But states 
promote children's welfare best by supporting impoverished families. 
At the very least, scholars interested in protecting families from state 
domination should acknowledge that foster care constitutes a form of 
state supervision of poor and minority children, and that adoption 
typically involves government disruption of their relationship with 
. their parentS. 118 
The revivalists' claim that adoption has been "significantly 
weakened in recent years" is simply wrong.119 What has been 
weakened by recent state and federal legislation is the national 
commitment to preserve ties between poor parents and their children. 
In November 1997, President Clinton signed the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act ("ASFA") 120 aimed at doubling the number of children 
adopted annually by 2002.121 The Act represents a striking shift in 
federal child welfare philosophy from an emphasis on the 
reunification of children in foster care with their biological families 
toward the adoption of these children into new families. 122 The Act's 
preference for adoption is implemented through swifter timetables 
for terminating the rights of biological parents to "free" children for 
adoption and the provision of technical assistance to states to 
facilitate adoptions. 123 The Act also gives states financial incentives to 
move more children into adoptive homes.124 Although ASF A retains 
118. See generally Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423 
(1983) (arguing that states unjustifiably terminate parent's rights to maintain contact with 
children in foster care to free these children for adoption ). 
119. See COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 26. 
120. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101 , 111 Stat. 2115 
(1997) (codified in sca ttered sections of 42 U.S.C.) . 
121. See Cheers fo r New Law on Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1997, at A24. Preside nt 
Clinton 's Adop tion Initiative called on the Department of Hea lth and Human Services to 
prepare an agenda to remove barriers to adoption and included a 1998 budget request of $10 
million to assist states in meeting the Adoption Initiative's goals. See U.S. Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs., Adoption 2002: A Response to the Presidenti al Executive Memorandum on 
Adop tion Issued Dec. 14, 1996 (1997). 
122. I explore this shift in child welfa re policy more fully. Dorotht Roberts, fs Th ere Justice 
in Children 's Rights?: The Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy , U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
(forthcoming 2000). 
123. Social Securit y Act, 42 U.S. C.§§ 675(5)(C)-(E), 673(b )(i) (1999). 
124. Unde r ASFA, the federal government pays states $4000 multiplied by the amount by 
which the num ber of foster child adoptions in the state during the fisca l year exceeds a base 
number of fo ster child adoptions. !d. § 673b(d)(l)(A). The government pays $2000 for each 
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the requirement that states make reasonable efforts to r 
children with their families, it encourages concurrent efforts to 
these children with adoptive parents.125 
The passage of AFSA corresponded with 
disparagement of mothers receiving public assistance we 
reform's retraction of the federal safety net for poor children.l26 The 
rejection of public aid to poor families in favor of private solutions to 
poverty, such as marriage and child support enforcement, is mirrored· 
in the appeal to adoption to reduce the burgeoning foster care 
population. The intersection of these federal welfare and adoption , 
reform laws marks the first time in this nation's history that "states · 
have a federal mandate to protect children from abuse and neglect, 
but no corresponding mandate to provide basic economic support to 
poor families." 127 The act was also tied to the growing interest in 
removing barriers to white middle-class couples' ability to adopt, 
especially race-matching adoption policies.128 Thus, the civil society · 
revivalists' policy recommendations merely endorse the existing 
consensus to reject any national effort to address the systemic causes 
of children's deprivation, and to pursue instead the private remedies 
of marriage and adoption. 
Like Congress, the revivalists have misidentified the problem 
with the U.S. child welfare system. The injustice of foster care does 
not stem from the small number of children being adopted; it stems 
from the large number of children removed from their homes. 
Virtually all of these children are poor and a startling percentage are 
Black.129 In 1996, Black children made up forty-five percent of the 
foster care population although they were only fifteen percent of the 
adoption of a special needs child. Id. § 673b(d)(1)(B). 
125. States may concurrently "identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family" to 
adopt the child. Jd. § 675(5)(e). 
126. See MINK, supra note 109, at 123-24. 
127. Martha Matthews, Assessing the Impact of Welfare Reform on Child Welfare, 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 395. 
128. See Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 5115(a) (repealed 1996) 
(prohibiting agencies receiving federal funding from placing children according to race); see also 
Civil Rights Act, 42 U .S.C. § 1996(b) (prohibiting agencies receiving federal funding from 
denying anyone the opportunity to become an adoptive or foster parent from delaying or 
denying the placement of a child on the basis of race). 
129. See DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 155 (1994) ("[l]nadequacy of 
income more than any other factor, constitutes the reason that children are removed."); see also 
RENNY GOLDEN, DISPOSABLE CHILDREN: Atv!ERICA'S WELFARE SYSTEM 13-62 (1997). See 
generally LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1989) (criticizing the removal of 
poor children from their homes for parental neglect). 
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general population under age eighteen.13° In the nation's urban 
·· centers, the racial disparity is even worse. Chicago's foster care 
· population, for example, is almost ninety percent Black.l31 Of 42,000 
children in foster care in New York City, less than 2000 are white. 132 
once Black children enter foster care, they remain there longer, are 
moved more often, and receive less desirable placements than white 
children.133 Even if all of the thousands of Black children in foster 
care were adopted tomorrow, there would still be a problem. 
The focus on adoption as the solution to the foster care crisis 
directs attention away from the excessive state removal of poor Black 
children from their homes. A civil society should be wary of state 
solutions to social problems that rely on terminating parents' rights, 
rather than on reducing poverty or building stronger supports for 
families. These efforts should include both national policies capable 
of ensuring children's material welfare and community-based 
programs designed to preserve families . The revivalists' turn to 
adoption as the only strategy for improving the child welfare system is 
further illustration of their moral exclusivity. 
CONCLUSION 
A recent reminder of the challenge racism poses for civil society 
is the scene of white housewives stationed along South Boston streets 
shouting "niggers, go home" at buses of Black children arriving under 
a 1974 federal school desegregation plan. 134 Brent Staples notes that 
these housewives had their defenders: "At the time, community 
leaders like Louise Day Hicks and State Representative \:Villiam 
Bulgar portrayed Southie as a 'family-oriented community' where 
people weren' t really racist, just concerned about controlling their 
schools and the lives of their children. "135 According to these 
130. A dministration for Children and Families et aL, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Sen's., 
How Many Children Were in Foster Care on ,'.I arch 31, 1998 (visited Mar. 6, 2000) <http ://www. 
acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/stats/a r0199a.htm>. 
131. See PATRICK MURPHY, WASTED 96 (1997). 
132. i\;!artin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What 10 Do About It: Is the 
Problem rhat Too Many Children Are Entering Foster Care?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 144 
(1999). 
133. See generally Edmund Mech , Public Social Services to jvfinority Children and Th eir 
Fam ilies , in CHILDREN IN NEED OF ROOTS (R.O. W ashington & Joan Baros-Van Hull eds., 
1985). 
134. See Brent Staples, A Prayer f or rhe Dead , N.Y. T IMES BOOK R EV., Oct. 3, 1999, at 3 
(reviewing M ICHAEL PATRICK MACDONALD, ALL SOULS: A FAMILY STORY FROM SOUTHIE 
(1999)). 
135. !d. 
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'lj 
' j 
politicians, their neighbors were simply guarding civil society. j 
Today's civil society advocates would certainly condemn the ., .l 
housewives' bigotry as well as the vulgar methods they employed to J 
preserve their civic circle. Yet the revivalists' conception of civil · 1 
society would embrace the father-headed homes in which these l 
women raised their children as well as the mothers' objective to shield 
parental authority from federal intrusion. Their model does little on 
the other hand, to reverse the forces that made the children and 
housewives enemies. It upholds a community cohesiveness centered 
around marital families and a mythical shared civic faith while 
glossing over the deep-seated hatreds and injustices that really 
corrode the ideal of equal human dignity. A different strategy is 
needed to ensure that the Southie view of civil society does not 
prevail. Only by recognizing America's obscene social inequities as 
our chief moral problem and a critical threat to the institutions of civil 
society will the revivalists make "the commitment to freedom and 
justice for all" something more than nice-sounding words. 
